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Abstract. Every definite logic program has as its meaning a least Herbrand model with
respect to the program-independent ordering ⊆. In the case of normal logic programs there
do not exist least models in general. However, according to a recent approach by Rondo-
giannis and Wadge, who consider infinite-valued models, every normal logic program does
have a least model with respect to a program-independent ordering. We show that this ap-
proach can be extended to formula-based logic programs (i.e., finite sets of rules of the form
A← φ where A is an atom and φ an arbitrary first-order formula). We construct for a given
program P an interpretation MP and show that it is the least of all models of P .
Keywords: Logic programming, semantics of programs, negation-as-failure, infinite-valued
logics, set theory
1 Introduction
It is well-known that every definite logic program P has a Herbrand model and the intersection of
all its Herbrand models is also a model of P . We call it the least Herbrand model or the canonical
model of P and constitute that it is the intended meaning of the program. If we consider a normal
logic program P it is more complicated to state the intended meaning of the program because the
intersection of all its models is not necessarily a model. There are many approaches to overcome
that problem. The existing approaches are not purely model-theoretic (i.e., there are normal logic
programs that have the same models but different intended meanings). However, there is a recent
purely model-theoretic approach of P. Rondogiannis and W. Wadge [3]. They prove that every
normal logic program has a least infinite-valued model. Their work is based on an infinite set of
truth values, ordered as follows:
F0 < F1 < ... < Fα < ... < 0 < ... < Tα < ... < T1 < T0
Intuitively, F0 and T0 are the classical truth values False and True, 0 is the truth value Unde-
fined and α is an arbitrary countable ordinal. The considered ordering of the interpretations is a
program-independent ordering on the infinite-valued interpretations and generalizes the classical
ordering on the Herbrand interpretations. The intended meaning of a normal logic program is,
as in the classical case, stated as the unique minimal infinite-valued model of P . Furthermore,
they show that the 3-valued interpretation that results from the least infinite-valued model of P
by collapsing all true values to True and all false values to False coincides with the well-founded
model of P introduced in [2].
Inspired by [4] we consider in this paper formula-based logic programs. A formula-based logic
program is a finite set of rules of the form A ← φ, where A is an atomic formula and φ is an
arbitrary first-order formula. We show that the construction methods to obtain the least infinite-
valued model of a normal logic program P given in [3] can be adapted to formula-based logic
programs. The initial step to carry out this adaption is the proof of two extension theorems.
⋆ This paper appears in the Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Applications of
Declarative Programming and Knowledge Management (INAP 2011).
Informally speaking, these theorems state that a complex formula shows the same behavior as
an atomic formula. While Rondogiannis and Wadge [3] make use of the fact that the bodies of
normal program rules are conjunctions of negative or positive atoms, we instead make use of one
of the extension theorems. The second step to achieve the adaption is the set-theoretical fact that
the least uncountable cardinal ℵ1 is regular (i.e., the limit of a countable sequence of countable
ordinals is in ℵ1). Contrary to the bodies of normal program rules, the bodies of formula-based
program rules can refer a ground atom to a countably infinite set of ground atoms. This is the
reason why we must use in our approach ℵ1 many iteration steps in the construction of the least
model of a given program P in conjunction with the regularity of ℵ1. In [3] ω many iteration steps
in conjunction with the fact that the limit of a finite sequence of natural numbers is once again
a natural number is sufficient to construct the least model. Towards the end of the paper, we use
again the regularity of ℵ1 to show that there is a countable ordinal δmax with the property that
every least model of a formula-based logic-program refers only to truth values of the form Tα or
Fα or 0, where α < δmax. This implies that we only need a very small fragment of the truth values
if we consider the meaning of a formula-based logic program. Finally, we show that the 3-valued
interpretation that results from the least infinite-valued model of a given formula-based logic pro-
gram by collapsing all true values to True and all false values to False, is a model of P in the
sense of [2]. But compared to the case of normal logic programs, the collapsed least infinite-valued
model of a formula-based logic program is not a minimal 3-valued model of P in general. However,
there is a simple restriction for the class of formula-based programs such that the collapsed model
is minimal in general.
At this point we would like to mention that we did not develop the theory presented in this paper
with respect to applied logic. We have a predominantly theoretical interest in extending the notion
of inductive definition to a wider class of rules.
We make heavy use of ordinal numbers in this paper. Therefore, we included an appendix with a
short introduction to ordinal numbers for those readers who are not familiar with this part of set
theory. Moreover, one can find the omitted proofs and a detailed discussion of an example within
the appendix. It is downloadable at:
http://www-ls.informatik.uni-tuebingen.de/luedecke/luedecke.html
2 Infinite-Valued Models
We are interested in logic programs based on a first-order Language L with finitely many predicate
symbols, function symbols, and constants.
Definition 1. The alphabet of L consists of the following symbols, where the numbers n, m, l,
s1,...,sn, r1,...,rm are natural numbers such that n, l, ri ≥ 1 and m, si ≥ 0 hold:
1. Predicate symbols: P1, ..., Pn with assigned arity s1, ..., sn
2. Function symbols: f1, ..., fm with assigned arity r1, ..., rm
3. Constants (abbr.: Con): c1, ..., cl
4. Variables (abbr.: Var): xk provided that k ∈ N
5. Connectives: ∧,∨,¬, ∀, ∃,⊥,⊤
6. Punctuation symbols: ’(’, ’)’ and ’,’
The natural numbers n,m, l, s1, ..., sn, r1, ..., rm ∈ N are fixed and the language L only depends on
these numbers. If we consider different languages of this type, we will write Ln,m,l,(si),(ri) instead
of L to prevent confusion. The following definitions depend on L. However, to improve readability,
we will not mention this again.
Definition 2. The set of terms Term is the smallest one satisfying:
1. Constants and variables are in Term.
2. If t1, ..., tri ∈ Term, then fi(t1, ..., tri) ∈ Term.
Definition 3. The Herbrand universe HU is the set of ground terms (i.e., terms that contain no
variables).
Definition 4. The set of formulas Form is the smallest one satisfying:
1. ⊥ and ⊤ are elements of Form.
2. If t1, ..., tsk ∈ Term, then Pk(t1, ..., tsk) ∈ Form.
3. If φ, ψ ∈ Form and v ∈ Var, then ¬(φ), (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), ∀v(φ), ∃v(φ) ∈ Form.
An atom is a formula only constructed by means of 1.) or 2.) and a ground atom is an atom that
contains no variables.
Definition 5. The Herbrand base HB is the set of all ground atoms, except ⊥ and ⊤.
Definition 6. A (formula-based) rule is of the form A← φ where φ is an arbitrary formula and
A is an arbitrary atom provided that A 6= ⊤ and A 6=⊥.
A (formula-based) logic program is a finite set of (formula-based) rules. Notice that we write
A ← instead of A ← ⊤. Remember A ← φ is called a normal rule (resp. definite rule) if φ is
a conjunction of literals (resp. positive literals). A finite set of normal (resp. definite) rules is a
normal (resp. definite) program.
Definition 7. The set of truth values W is given by
W := {〈0, n〉 ; n ∈ ℵ1} ∪ {0} ∪ {〈1, n〉 ; n ∈ ℵ1} .
Additionally, we define a strict linear ordering < on W as follows:
1. 〈0, n〉 < 0 and 0 < 〈1, n〉 for all n ∈ ℵ1
2. 〈w, x〉 < 〈y, z〉 iff
(w = 0 = y and x ∈ z) or (w = 1 = y and z ∈ x) or (w = 0 and y = 1)
We define Fi := 〈0, i〉 and Ti := 〈1, i〉 for all i ∈ ℵ1. Fi is a false value and Ti is a true value. The
value 0 is the undefined value. The following summarizes the situation (i ∈ ℵ1):
F0 < F1 < F2 < ... < Fi < ... < 0 < ... < Ti < ... < T2 < T1 < T0
Definition 8. The degree (abbr.: deg) of a truth value is given by deg(0) := ∞, deg(Fα) := α,
and deg(Tα) := α for all α ∈ ℵ1.
Definition 9. An (infinite-valued Herbrand) interpretation I is a function from the Herbrand
base HB to the set of truth values W . A variable assignment h is a mapping from Var to HU .
Definition 10. Let I be an interpretation and w ∈ W be a truth value, then I‖w is defined as
the inverse image of w under I (i.e., I‖w = {A ∈ HB; I(A) = w}).
Definition 11. Let I and J be interpretations and α ∈ ℵ1. We write I =α J, if for all β ≤ α,
I‖Fβ = J‖Fβ and I‖Tβ = J‖Tβ .
Definition 12. Let I and J be interpretations and α ∈ ℵ1. We write I ⊑α J , if for all β < α,
I =β J and furthermore J‖Fα ⊆ I‖Fα & I‖Tα ⊆ J‖Tα. We write I ⊏α J , if I ⊑α J and I 6=α J .
Now we define a partial ordering ⊑∞ on the set of all interpretations. It is easy to see that this
ordering generalizes the classical partial ordering⊆ on the set of 2-valued Herbrand interpretations.
Definition 13. Let I and J be interpretations. We write I ⊏∞ J , if there exists an α ∈ ℵ1 such
that I ⊏α J . We write I ⊑∞ J , if I ⊏∞ J or I = J .
Remark 1. To motivate these definitions let us briefly recall the classical 2-valued situation. There-
fore let us pick two (2-valued) Herbrand interpretations I, J ⊆ HB. Considering these, it becomes
apparent that I ⊆ J holds if and only if the set of ground atoms that are false w.r.t. J is a subset
of the set of ground atoms that are false w.r.t. I and the set of ground atoms that are true w.r.t.
I is a subset of the set of ground atoms that are true w.r.t. J .
Definition 14. Let h be a variable assignment. The semantics of terms is given by (with respect
to h):
1. JcKh = c if c is a constant.
2. JvKh = h(v) if v is a variable.
3. Jfi(t1, ..., tri)Kh = fi(Jt1Kh, ..., JtriKh) if 1 ≤ i ≤ m and t1, ..., tri ∈ Term.
Before we start to talk about the semantics of formulas, we have to show that every subset of
W has a least upper bound (abbr: sup) and a greatest lower bound (abbr: inf). The proof of the
following lemma is left to the reader. The proof is using the fact that every nonempty subset of
ℵ1 has a least element.
Lemma 1. For every subset M ⊆ W the least upper bound supM and the greatest lower bound
infM exist in W . Moreover, supM ∈ {Tα; α ∈ ℵ1} implies that supM ∈ M and on the other
hand infM ∈ {Fα; α ∈ ℵ1} implies that infM ∈M .
Definition 15. Let I be an interpretation and h be a variable assignment. The semantics of
formulas is given by (with respect to I and h):
1. If t1, ..., tsk ∈ Term, then JPk(t1, ..., tsk)K
I
h = I (Pk(Jt1Kh, ..., JtskKh)). Additionally, the seman-
tics of ⊤ and ⊥ is given by J⊤KIh = T0 and J⊥K
I
h = F0.
2. If φ, ψ ∈ Form and v an arbitrary variable, then Jφ ∧ ψKIh = min{JφK
I
h, JψK
I
h}, Jφ ∨ ψK
I
h =
max{ JφKIh , JψK
I
h }, J∃v(φ)K
I
h = sup{JφK
I
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU}, J∀v(φ)K
I
h = inf{JφK
I
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU}
and J¬(φ)KIh =


Tα+1, if JφK
I
h = Fα
Fα+1, if JφKIh = Tα
0, otherwise
.
Definition 16. Let A ← φ be a rule, P a program and I an interpretation. Then I satisfies
A← φ if for all variable assignment h the property JAKIh ≥ JφK
I
h holds. Furthermore, I is a model
of P if I satisfies all rules of P .
Definition 17. Let A ← φ be a rule and σ be a variable substitution (i.e., a function from Var
to Term with finite support). Then, Aσ ← φσ is a ground instance of the rule A← φ if Aσ ∈ HB
and all variables in φσ are in the scope of a quantifier. It is easy to see that that JAσKIh and JφσK
I
h
(with respect to an interpretation I and a variable assignment h) depend only on I. That is why
we write also JAσKI and JφσKI . We denote the set of all ground instances of a program P with
PG.
Example 1. Consider the formula-based program P given by the set of rules {P (c) ←, R(x) ←
¬P (x), P (Sx) ← ¬R(x), Q ← ∀x (P (x))}. Then it is easy to prove that the Herbrand interpre-
tation I = {P (Snc) 7→ T2n; n ∈ N} ∪ {R(Snc) 7→ F2n+1; n ∈ N} ∪ {Q 7→ Tω} is a model of P .
Moreover, using the results of this paper one can show that it is also the least Herbrand model of
P .
Remark 2. Before we proceed we want to give a short informal but intuitive description of the
semantics given above. Let us consider two rabbits named Bugs Bunny and Roger Rabbit. We
know about them, that Bugs Bunny is a grey rabbit and if Roger Rabbit is not a grey rabbit, then
he is a white one. This information can be understood as a normal logic program:
grey(Bugs Bunny) ⇐
white(Roger Rabbit) ⇐ not grey(Roger Rabbit)
There is no doubt that Bugs Bunny is grey is true because it is a fact. There is also no doubt
that every try to prove that Roger Rabbit is grey will fail. Hence, using the negation-as-failure
rule, we can infer that Roger Rabbit is white is also true. But everybody would agree that there
is a difference of quality between the two statements because negation-as-failure is not a sound
inference rule. The approach of [3] suggests that the ground atom grey(Bugs Bunny) receives the
best possible truth value named T0 because it is a fact of the program. The atom grey(Roger Rabbit)
receives the worst possible truth value named F0 because of the negation-as-failure approach.
Hence, using the above semantics for negation, white(Roger Rabbit) receives only the second best
truth value T1.
3 The Immediate Consequence Operator
Definition 18. Let P be a program, then the immediate consequence operator TP for the program
P is a mapping from and into {I; I is an interpretation}, where TP (I) maps an A ∈ HB to
TP (I)(A) := sup{JφKI ; A← φ ∈ PG}. (Notice that PG can be infinite and hence we cannot use
max instead of sup.)
Definition 19. Let α be an arbitrary countable ordinal. A function T from and into the set of
interpretations is called α-monotonic iff for all interpretations I and J the property I ⊑α J ⇒
T (I) ⊑α T (J) holds.
We will show that TP is α-monotonic. Before we will give the proof of this property, we have to
prove the first extension theorem.
Theorem 1 (Extension Theorem I). Let α be an arbitrary countable ordinal and I, J two
interpretations provided that I ⊑α J . The following properties hold for every formula φ:
1. If F0 ≤ w ≤ Fα and h an assignment, then JφKJh = w ⇒ JφK
I
h = w.
2. If Tα ≤ w ≤ T0 and h an assignment, then JφKIh = w ⇒ JφK
J
h = w.
3. If deg(w) < α and h an assignment, then JφKIh = w ⇔ JφK
J
h = w.
Proof. We show these statements by induction on φ. Let IH(X) be an abbreviation for 1. and 2.
and 3., where φ is replaced by X (induction hypothesis).
Case 1: φ = ⊤ or φ =⊥. In this case 1., 2., and 3. are obviously true.
Case 2: φ = Pk(t1, ..., tsk). 1., 2., and 3. follow directly from I ⊑α J .
Case 3: φ = ¬(A). We assume that IH(A). We show simultaneously that 1., 2. and 3. also
hold. Therefore, we choose an assignment h and a truth value w such that F0 ≤ w ≤ Fα resp.
Tα ≤ w ≤ T0 resp. deg(w) < α. Assume that JφKJh = w resp. JφK
I
h = w resp. JφK
K1
h = w (where
K1 = I and K2 = J or K1 = J and K2 = I). Using Definition 15 we get that Tα−1 ≤ JAK
J
h ≤ T0
resp. F0 ≤ JAKIh ≤ Fα−1 resp. deg(JAK
K1
h ) < α − 1. Then, from the third part of IH(A),
JAKJh = JAK
I
h resp. JAK
I
h = JAK
J
h resp. JAK
K1
h = JAK
K2
h . Finally, using Definition 15, we get that
JφKIh = w resp. JφK
J
h = w resp. JφK
K2
h = w.
Before we can go on with the next case, we must prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2. We use the same assumptions as in Theorem 1. Let I be a set of indices, Ai (i ∈ I) a
formula provided that IH(Ai) and hi (i ∈ I) an assignment. We define infK := inf{JAiKKhi ; i ∈ I}
and supK := sup{JAiK
K
hi
; i ∈ I} (where K = I, J). Then the following holds:
1. infJ = Fγ ⇒ infI = Fγ (for all γ ≤ α)
2. infI = Tγ ⇒ infJ = Tγ (for all γ ≤ α)
3. infI = w ⇔ infJ = w (for all w provided that deg(w) < α)
4. supJ = Fγ ⇒ supI = Fγ (for all γ ≤ α)
5. supI = Tγ ⇒ supJ = Tγ (for all γ ≤ α)
6. supI = w ⇔ supJ = w (for all w provided that deg(w) < α)
Proof. 1.: Assume that infJ = Fγ . Using Lemma 1 we get that there exists an i0 such that
JAi0K
J
hi0
= Fγ . Then, from the first part of IH(Ai0 ), JAi0K
I
hi0
= Fγ . This implies that JAi0K
I
hi0
≤
JAiK
I
hi
for all i ∈ I. (Since otherwise we had that there exists a j0 ∈ I such that JAj0K
I
hj0
< Fγ .
Then, using the third part of IH(Aj0 ), it would also be JAj0K
J
hj0
< Fγ . But this contradicts our
assumption infJ = Fγ .) Finally, we get that infI = Fγ .
2.: Assume now, that infI = Tγ . Then Tγ ≤ JAiKIhi for all i ∈ I. Using part two of IH(Ai), we get
that JAiK
I
hi
= JAiK
J
hi
for all i. This implies infJ = Tγ .
3.: Due to 1. and 2., it only remains to show (infJ = Tγ ⇒ infI = Tγ) and (infI = Fγ ⇒ infJ =
Fγ) for γ < α. Assume that infJ = Tγ (where γ < α). Then Tγ ≤ JAiK
J
hi
for all i ∈ I and this
implies, using the third part of IH(Ai), JAiK
J
hi
= JAiK
I
hi
for all i. Finally, we get that infI = Tγ .
For the latter case assume that infI = Fγ (γ < α). Then there exists an i0 such that JAi0K
I
hi0
= Fγ
(Lemma 1). Then, using the third part of IH(Ai0), we get that JAi0K
J
hi0
= Fγ . This implies that
JAi0K
J
hi0
≤ JAiKJhi for all i ∈ I. (Since otherwise we had that there exists a j0 ∈ I such that
JAj0K
I
hj0
< Fγ , see proof of statement 1.) Finally, we get that infJ = Fγ .
We will not give the proofs of 4., 5., and 6. here, because they are similar to 1., 2., and 3.. ⊓⊔
Case 4: φ = A ∧ B. Assume that IH(A) and IH(B). Let h be an arbitrary assumption. We
define I := {1, 2}, h1 := h, h2 := h, A1 := A and A2 := B. Then IH(Ai) for i = 1, 2, JφKJh =
min{JAKJh , JBK
J
h} = infJ and JφK
I
h = min{JAK
I
h, JBK
I
h} = infI . Then, using 1., 2. and 3. of Lemma
2, we get that 1., 2. and 3. of Theorem 1 hold.
Case 5: φ = A ∨B. Replace min by max and inf by sup in the proof above and use 4., 5. and 6.
of Lemma 2 instead of 1., 2. and 3..
Case 6: φ = ∀v(A). Assume that IH(A) and let h be an arbitrary assumption.
We define I := {u; u ∈ HU}, hu := h[v 7→ u] and Au := A for all u ∈ HU . Then IH(Au) for all
u ∈ I, JφKJh = inf{JAK
J
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = infJ , and JφK
I
h = inf{JAK
I
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = infI . Then,
using 1., 2. and 3. of Lemma 2, we get that 1., 2. and 3. of Theorem 1 hold.
Case 7: φ = ∃v(A). Replace inf by sup in the proof above and use 4., 5. and 6. of Lemma 2 instead
of 1., 2. and 3.. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. The immediate consequence operator TP of a given program P is α-monotonic for all
countable ordinals α.
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α. Assume the lemma holds for all β < α (induction
hypothesis). We demonstrate that it also holds for α. Let I, J be two interpretations such that
I ⊑α J . Then, using the induction hypothesis, we get that
TP (I) =β TP (J) for all β < α. (1)
It remains to show that TP (I) ‖ Tα ⊆ TP (J) ‖ Tα and that TP (J) ‖ Fα ⊆ TP (I) ‖ Fα. For
the first statement assume that TP (I)(A) = Tα for some A ∈ HB. Then, using Lemma 1, there
exists a ground instance A ← φ of P such that JφKI = Tα. But then, by Theorem 1, JφKJ = Tα.
This implies Tα ≤ TP (J)(A). But this implies Tα = TP (J)(A). (Since Tα < TP (J)(A), using (1),
would imply Tα < TP (I)(A).) For the latter statement assume that TP (J)(A) = Fα for some
A ∈ HB. This implies that JφKJ ≤ Fα for every ground instance A ← φ of P . But then, using
again Theorem 1, we get that JφKI = JφKJ for every ground instance A → φ of P . Finally, this
implies also TP (I)(A) = Fα. ⊓⊔
Remark 3. The immediate consequence operator TP is not monotonic with respect to ⊑∞. Con-
sider the program P = {A ← ¬A} and the interpretations I1 and I2 given by I1 := {A 7→ F0}
and I2 := {A 7→ 0}. Obviously, I1 ⊏0 I2 and hence I1 ⊑∞ I2. Using Definition 18, we get that
TP (I1) = sup{J¬AKI1} = T1 and TP (I2) = sup{J¬AKI2} = 0. This implies TP (I2) ⊏1 TP (I1) (i.e.,
TP (I1) ⊑∞ TP (I2) does not hold).
4 Construction of the Minimum Model
In this section we show how to construct the interpretation MP of a given formula-based logic
program P . We will give the proof that MP is a model of P and that it is the least of all models
of P in the next section. In [3] the authors give a clear informal description of the following
construction:
“As a first approximation to MP , we start (...) iterating the TP on ∅ until both the set of atoms
that have a F0 value and the set of atoms having T0 value, stabilize. We keep all these atoms
whose values have stabilized and reset the values of all remaining atoms to the next false value
(namely F1). The procedure is repeated until the F1 and T1 values stabilize, and we reset the
remaining atoms to a value equal to F2, and so on. Since the Herbrand Base of P is countable,
there exists a countable ordinal δ for which this process will not produce any new atoms having
Fδ or Tδ values. At this point we stop iteration and reset all remaining atoms to the value 0.”
Definition 20. Let P be a program, I an interpretation, and α ∈ ℵ1 such that I ⊑α TP (I). We
define by recursion on the ordinal β ∈ Ω the interpretation T βP,α(I) as follows:
T 0P,α(I) := I and if β is a successor ordinal, then T
β
P,α := TP (T
β−1
P,α ). If 0 < β is a limit ordinal
and A ∈ HB, then
T βP,α(I)(A) :=


I(A), if deg(I(A)) < α
Tα, if A ∈
⋃
γ∈β T
γ
P,α(I)‖Tα
Fα, if A ∈
⋂
γ∈β T
γ
P,α(I)‖Fα
Fα+1, otherwise
.
Lemma 4. Let P be a program, I an interpretation and α ∈ ℵ1 such that I ⊑α TP (I). Then the
following holds:
1. For all limit ordinals 0 < γ ∈ Ω and all interpretations M the condition ∀β < γ : T βP,α(I) ⊑α
M implies T γP,α(I) ⊑α M .
2. For all β ≤ γ ∈ Ω the property T βP,α(I) ⊑α T
γ
P,α(I) holds.
Proof. 1.: The proof follows directly from the above definition.
2.: One can prove the second statement with induction, using the assumption I ⊑α TP (I), the
fact that TP is α-monotonic, the fact that ⊑α is transitive and at limit stage the first statement
of this lemma. ⊓⊔
At this point, we have to consider a theorem of Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic set theory with the
Axiom of Choice (ZFC). In the case of normal logic programs this theorem is not necessary, because
in the bodies of normal logic programs do not appear “∀” or “∃”. One can find the proof of the
theorem in [1].
Definition 21. Let α > 0 be a limit ordinal. We say that an increasing β-sequence (αζ)ζ<β , β
limit ordinal, is cofinal in α if sup{αζ; ζ < β} = α. Similarly, A ⊆ α is cofinal in α if supA = α.
If α is an infinite limit ordinal, the cofinality of α is cf(α) = “the least limit ordinal β such that
there is an increasing β-sequence (αζ)ζ<β with sup{αζ ; ζ < β} = α”. An infinite cardinal ℵα is
regular if cf(ℵα) = ℵα.
Theorem 2. Every cardinal of the form ℵα+1 is regular. Particularly, ℵ1 is regular.
Theorem 3 (Extension Theorem II). Let P be a program, I an interpretation, and α ∈ ℵ1
such that I ⊑α TP (I). Then for every formula φ ∈ Form and every assignment h the following
hold:
1. JφK
T
ℵ1
P,α
(I)
h = JφK
I
h, if deg(JφK
I
h) < α (C1)
2. JφK
T
ℵ1
P,α
(I)
h = Tα, if JφK
T iP,α(I)
h = Tα for some i ∈ ℵ1 (C2)
3. JφK
T
ℵ1
P,α(I)
h = Fα, if JφK
T iP,α(I)
h = Fα for all i ∈ ℵ1 (C3)
4. Fα < JφK
T
ℵ1
P,α
(I)
h < Tα ⇔ not(C1) and not(C2) and not(C3)
Proof. 1. and 2.: We get this using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1.
3.: We show this by induction on φ. We define Ii := T
i
P,α(I) and I∞ := T
ℵ1
P,α(I). Moreover, we use
IH(X) as an abbreviation for
“for all assignments g the property ∀i ∈ ℵ1(JXKIig = Fα)⇒ JXK
I∞
g = Fα holds”.
Case 1: φ = Pk(t1, ..., tsk) or = ⊤,⊥. This follows directly from Definition 20 respectively from
Definition 15.
Case 2: φ = ¬(A). Assuming ∀i ∈ ℵ1: JφK
Ii
h = Fα we conclude ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ii
h = Tα−1. Then, by
Theorem 1, we get JAKI∞h = Tα−1 and this implies JφK
I∞
h = Fα.
Case 3: φ = A ∧B or φ = A ∨B. The following cases are more general than this case. Therefore,
we will not give a proof here.
Case 4: φ = ∃v(A). We assume that IH(A) and for every i ∈ ℵ1 we assume that JφK
Ii
h = Fα.
This implies sup{JAKI
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = Fα as well as ∀i ∈ ℵ1∀u ∈ HU : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u] ≤ Fα. Now
we show by case distinction that ∀u ∈ HU : JAK
I∞
h[v 7→u] = JAK
I
h[v 7→u] and this obviously implies
JφKI∞h = Fα. First we consider the case JAK
I
h[v 7→u] < Fα. Then, using Lemma 4 and Theorem
1, we get that JAKI∞
h[v 7→u] = JAK
I
h[v 7→u]. At least, we consider the other case JAK
I
h[v 7→u] = Fα.
We know that ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u] ≤ Fα. But this implies ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u] = Fα, since
∃i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u] < Fα would imply (using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1) JAK
I
h[v 7→u] < Fα, which is
a contradiction. Finally, we get, by IH(A), that JAK
I∞
h = Fα = JAK
I
h[v 7→u].
Case 5: φ = ∀v(A). We assume that IH(A) and for every i ∈ ℵ1 we assume that JφK
Ii
h = Fα.
Then ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : inf{JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = Fα. This implies, using Lemma 1, ∀i ∈ ℵ1∃u ∈
HU : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u] = Fα. Next we choose for every i ∈ ℵ1 an atom ui ∈ HU with JAK
Ii
h[v 7→ui ]
= Fα
(Remark: We do not need the Axiom of Choice because HU is countable). Then, using Lemma 4
and Theorem 1, ∀i ∈ ℵ1∀j ≤ i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ij
h[v 7→ui]
= Fα . This implies that the mapping
ζ : {ui; i ∈ ℵ1} → ℵ1 ∪ {ℵ1} : u 7→
{
min{j ∈ ℵ1; JAK
Ij
h[v 7→u] 6= Fα}, if min exists
ℵ1, otherwise
has the properties ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : ζ(ui) > i and sup{ζ(ui); i ∈ ℵ1} = ℵ1. We assume now that
∀u ∈ HU∃j ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ij
h[v 7→u] 6= Fα. Then ζ({ui; i ∈ ℵ1}) is a countable subset of ℵ1 and moreover
cofinal in ℵ1. But this is a contradiction to Theorem 2. Therefore we know that there exists an atom
u∗ ∈ HU such that ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JAK
Ii
h[v 7→u∗] = Fα. Then, using IH(A), we get that JAK
I∞
h[v 7→u∗] = Fα.
This implies JφKI∞h ≤ Fα and finally, using JφK
I
h = Fα, Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we get that
JφKI∞h = Fα.
4.:“⇒”: We prove this by the method of contrapositive. We assume that (C1) or (C2) or (C3).
Then, using 1., 2., and 3., we get that not(Fα < JφK
I∞
h < Tα) holds.
“⇐”: We shall first consider the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 3 for every formula φ ∈ Form and every
assignment h the following hold:
JφKI∞h = Tα ⇒ JφK
Ii
h = Tα for some i ∈ ℵ1
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 statement 3. (see Appendix). ⊓⊔
We prove “⇐” also by the method of contrapositive. We assume that Fα < JφK
I∞
h < Tα does not
hold. We consider the three possible cases deg(JφKI∞h ) < α, JφK
I∞
h = Fα, and JφK
I∞
h = Tα. Let us
consider the first case (resp. the second case). Then, using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, (C1) (resp.
(C3)) holds. Now, we consider the latter case. Using Lemma 5 we get that (C2) holds. Finally, in
every case (C1) or (C2) or (C3) holds. ⊓⊔
Definition 22. Let α be a countable ordinal and for every γ < α let Iγ be an interpretation
such that ∀ζ ≤ γ : Iζ =ζ Iγ . Then the union of the interpretations Iγ (γ < α) is a well-defined
interpretation and given by the following definition:
⊔
γ<α
Iγ (A) :=


Fζ , if ζ < α & Iζ(A) = Fζ
Tζ , if ζ < α & Iζ(A) = Tζ
Fα, otherwise
(A ∈ HB)
Remark 4. Using ∀ζ ≤ γ : Iζ =ζ Iγ it is easy to prove that the union
⊔
γ<α Iγ is a well-defined
interpretation. Particularly if α = 0, then the union is equal to the interpretation that maps all
atoms of HB to the truth value F0. This interpretation is sometimes denoted by ∅.
Lemma 6. Let P be a program, α be a countable ordinal and for all γ < α an interpretation Iγ
is given such that ∀ζ < γ : Iζ =ζ Iγ . Then the following holds:
∀γ < α (Iγ ⊑γ+1 TP (Iγ)) ⇒
⊔
γ<α
Iγ ⊑α TP (
⊔
γ<α
Iγ)
Proof. We assume that
∀γ < α (Iγ ⊑γ+1 TP (Iγ)) . (2)
First, we prove that ∀β < α :
⊔
γ<α Iγ =β TP (
⊔
γ<α Iγ). For all β < α we know that Iβ =β⊔
γ<α Iγ . Then, using Lemma 3, ∀β < α : TP (Iβ) =β TP (
⊔
γ<α Iγ). This implies for all β < α the
property
⊔
γ<α Iγ =β Iβ =
(2)
β TP (Iβ) =β TP (
⊔
γ<α Iγ). We know that
⊔
γ<α Iγ does not map to
truth values w such that Fα < w ≤ Tα. And this obviously implies
⊔
γ<α Iγ ⊑α TP (
⊔
γ<α Iγ). ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Let P be a program, α a countable ordinal, and I an interpretation. Then the following
holds:
I ⊑α TP (I) ⇒ T
ℵ1
P,α(I) ⊑α+1 TP (T
ℵ1
P,α(I))
Proof. Again, we define Ii := T
i
P,α(I), I∞ := T
ℵ1
P,α(I). Let us assume that I ⊑α TP (I). First we
prove I∞ ⊑α TP (I∞). Using Lemma 4 we get that ∀γ < ℵ1 : Iγ ⊑α I∞. Then, using Lemma
3, γ ∈ ℵ1 : Iγ+1 ⊑α TP (I∞). Using again Lemma 4 and the transitivity of ⊑α we get that
∀γ < ℵ1 : Iγ ⊑α TP (I∞). Then, using the first part of Lemma 4, I∞ ⊑α TP (I∞).
Let us prove now TP (I∞) ⊑α I∞. It remains to show
I∞ ‖ Fα ⊆ TP (I∞) ‖ Fα (3)
as well as
TP (I∞)‖Tα ⊆ I∞‖Tα. (4)
Firstly, let us prove that (3) holds and therefore we assume that I∞(A) = Fα for some A ∈ HB.
Then, using the definition of I∞, we get that for all i ∈ ℵ1 the following holds:
Ii(A) = Fα (5)
Let A ← φ be an arbitrary ground instance of P . We prove now that the property JφKI∞ = JφKI
holds. Then, using (5) and the definition of the immediate consequence operator TP , we get that
Fα = I1(A) = sup{JCKI ; A← C ∈ PG}. This implies either JφKI < Fα or JφKI = Fα. We consider
the first case. Then, using Theorem 3, we get that JφKI∞ = JφKI . In the latter case, using again
(5), we get that for all i ∈ ℵ1 the property Fα = Ii+1(A) = sup{JCKIi ; A ← C ∈ PG} holds.
This obviously implies ∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JφKIi ≤ Fα. Then, using Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we get that
∀i ∈ ℵ1 : JφKIi = Fα. But then the third part of Theorem 3 finally implies that JφKI∞ = Fα = JφKI .
Thus the above argumentation implies that for all A← φ in PG the equation JφKI∞ = JφKI holds.
This implies Fα = I1(A) = sup{JφKI ; A← φ ∈ PG} = sup{JφKI∞ ; A← φ ∈ PG} = TP (I∞)(A).
Secondly, let us prove (4) and therefore we assume now that TP (I∞)(A) = Tα for some A ∈ HB.
Then sup{JφKI∞ ; A ← φ ∈ PG} = Tα. This and Lemma 1 allow us to choose a ground instance
A← φ such that JφKI∞ = Tα. Then, using Lemma 5, we can choose an ordinal i0 ∈ ℵ1 such that
JφKIi0 = Tα. This implies JAK
Ii0+1 ≥ Tα. We know Ii0+1 ⊑α TP (I∞) by Lemma 4 and Lemma 3.
But then, using Theorem 1 and the assumption of this case, JAKIi0+1 = Tα must hold. Finally,
using the second part of Theorem 3, we get that I∞(A) = Tα.
The argumentation above implies that I∞ =α TP (I∞). We know that I∞ does not map to truth
values w such that Fα+1 < w ≤ Tα+1. And this obviously implies I∞ ⊑α+1 TP (I∞). ⊓⊔
Definition 23. Let P be a program. We define by recursion on the countable ordinal α the
approximant Mα of P as follows:
Mα :=


T ℵ1P,α(
⊔
γ<αMγ), if
∀γ < α∀ζ < γ (Mζ =ζ Mγ) &⊔
γ<αMγ ⊑α TP (
⊔
γ<αMγ)
∅, otherwise
Theorem 4. Let P be a program, then for all α ∈ ℵ1 the following holds:
1. ∀γ < α (Mγ =γ Mα)
2.
⊔
γ<αMγ ⊑α TP (
⊔
γ<αMγ)
3. Mα = T
ℵ1
P,α(
⊔
γ<αMγ)
4. Mα ⊑α+1 TP (Mα)
Proof. We prove this by induction on α. We assume that the theorem holds for all β < α (induction
hypothesis). We prove that it holds also for α. Using the induction hypothesis, we get that for
every β < α the following properties hold ∀γ < β : Mγ =γ Mβ as well as Mβ ⊑β+1 TP (Mβ).
Then, using Lemma 6, we get that
⊔
γ<αMγ ⊑α TP (
⊔
γ<αMγ) (this is 2.). This together with the
above definition imply Mα = T
ℵ1
P,α(
⊔
γ<αMγ) (this is 3.). Then, using 2. and 3. and Lemma 7, we
get that Mα ⊑α+1 TP (Mα) (this is 4.). It remains to prove the first statement. We know that for
all γ < α the property Mγ =γ
⊔
γ′<αMγ′⊑α
(Lemma 4 & 2.)T ℵ1P,α(
⊔
γ′<αMγ′) =
3. Mα holds. Then,
using that ⊑α is stronger than =γ , we get that 1. also holds. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. Let P be a program. Then there exists an ordinal δ ∈ ℵ1 such that
∀γ ≥ δ :Mγ‖Fγ = ∅ and Mγ‖Tγ = ∅. (6)
Proof. We define the subset H∗B of the Herbrand base HB by H
∗
B := {A ∈ HB; ∃γ ∈ ℵ1 :Mγ(A) ∈
{Fγ , Tγ}}. Then, using part one of Theorem 4, we know that for every A ∈ H∗B there is exactly one
γA such that MγA(A) ∈ {FγA , TγA}. Now let us define the function ζ by ζ : H
∗
B → ℵ1 : A 7→ γA.
We know that H∗B is countable. This implies that ζ(H
∗
B) is also countable. Then, using Theorem
2, we know that ζ(H∗B) is not cofinal in ℵ1. This obviously implies that there is an ordinal δ ∈ ℵ1
such that ∀A ∈ H∗B : ζ(A) < δ. Finally, this ordinal δ satisfies the property (6). ⊓⊔
Definition 24. Let P be a program. The lemma above justifies the definition δP := min{δ; ∀γ ≥
δ :Mγ‖Fγ = ∅ and Mγ‖Tγ = ∅} ∈ ℵ1. This ordinal δP is called the depth of the program P .
Definition 25. We define the interpretation MP of a given formula-based logic program P by
MP (A) :=
{
MδP (A), if deg(MδP (A)) < δP
0, otherwise
.
5 Properties of the Interpretation MP
Proposition 1. Let P be a program. The interpretationMP is a fixed point of TP (i.e., TP (MP ) =
MP ).
Proof. See Theorem 7.1 in [3]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Let P be a program. The interpretation MP is a model of P .
Proof. See Theorem 7.2 in [3]. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2. Let P be a program, α a countable ordinal and M an arbitrary model of P . Then
the following holds:
∀β < α (Mβ =β M)⇒Mα ⊑α M
Proof. We assume that ∀β < α (Mβ =β M). Definition 22 implies that⊔
β<α
Mβ ⊑α M . (7)
Now we prove that the following holds:
TP (M) ⊑α M (8)
Using Lemma 3 and the assumption above, we get that ∀β < α (TP (Mβ) =β TP (M)). This the
assumption above and the fourth part of Theorem 4 imply that ∀β < α : M =β TP (M). But
this, together with with the fact that M is a model (i.e., M(A) ≥ TP (M)(A) holds for all atoms
A ∈ HU ), implies that (8) holds.
We finish the proof by induction on the ordinal γ ∈ Ω. Using Lemma 3 and (8), we get that
T γP,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α M implies T
γ+1
P,α (
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α M . Using the first part of Lemma 4, we get
for every limit ordinal γ that ∀β < γ : T βP,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α M implies T
γ
P,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α M .
Then, using (7) and statement 3. of Theorem 4, Mα = T
ℵ1
P,α(
⊔
β<αMβ) ⊑α M holds. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. The interpretation MP of a given program P is the least of all models of P (i.e.,
for all models M of P the property MP ⊑∞ M holds).
Proof. Let M be an arbitrary model of P . Without loss of generality, we assume that M 6=
MP . Then let α be the least ordinal such that ∀β < α (MP =β M). This implies also ∀β <
α (Mβ =β M). Then, using Proposition 2, MP =α Mα ⊑α M . The choice of α implies that
MP 6=α M . Then we get that MP ⊏α M and this finally implies MP ⊑∞ M . ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let P be a program. The interpretation MP is the least of all fixed points of TP .
Proof. It is easy to prove that every fixed point of TP is also a model of P . This together with
Proposition 1 and Theorem 6 imply Corollary 1. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3. There is a countable ordinal δ ∈ ℵ1 such that for all programs P of an arbitrary
language Ln,m,l,(si),(ri) the property δP < δ holds. Let δmax be the least ordinal such that the above
property holds.
Proof. We know that the set of all signatures 〈n,m, l, (si)1≤i≤n, (ri)1≤i≤m〉 is countable. Addi-
tionally, we know that the set of all programs of a fixed signature is also countable (Remember
that a program is a finite set of rules.). This implies that the set of all programs is countable.
Then we get that the image of the function from the set of all programs to ℵ1 given by P 7→ δP
is countable. Then, using Theorem 2, the image of δ(·) is not cofinal in ℵ1 (i.e., there exists an
ordinal δ ∈ ℵ1 such that for all programs P the property δP < δ holds). ⊓⊔
Proposition 4. The ordinal δmax is at least ω
ω.
Proof. Let n > 0 be a natural number. We consider the program Pn consisting of the following
rules (where G,H are predicate symbols, f is a function symbol and c is a constant):
G(x1, ..., xn−1, f(xn))← ¬¬G(x1, ..., xn−1, xn)
For all k provided that 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1 the rule:
G(x1, ..., xk−1, f(xk), c, ..., c)← ∃xk+1, ..., xnG(x1, ..., xk−1, xk, xk+1, ..., xn)
H ← ∃x1, ..., xnG(x1, ..., xn)
This implies that MPn maps G
(
fk1(c), ..., fkn(c)
)
to F∑n−1
m=1 kmω
n−m+kn·2
and H to Fωn . ⊓⊔
At the end of this paper we will prove that the 3-valued interpretation MP,3 that results from the
infinite-valued model MP by collapsing all true values to True (abbr. T ) and all false values to
False (abbr. F) is also a model in the sense of the following semantics:
Definition 26. The semantics of formulas with respect to 3-valued interpretations is defined as
in Definition 15 except that J⊤KIh = T , J⊥K
I
h = F and
J¬(φ)KIh =


T , if JφKIh = F
F , if JφKIh = T
0, otherwise
.
The Definition 16 is also suitable in the case of 3-valued interpretations. The truth values are
ordered as follows: F < 0 < T
Proposition 5. Let P be a program and let collapse(·) be the function from W to the set {F , 0, T }
given by Fi 7→ F , 0 7→ 0 and Ti 7→ T . Moreover, let I be an arbitrary interpretation then collapse(I)
is the 3-valued interpretation given by collapse(I)(A) := collapse(I(A)) for all A ∈ HB. Then for
all formulas φ and all assignments h the following holds:
collapse(JφKIh) = JφK
collapse(I)
h
Proof. One can prove this by induction on the structure of φ together with Theorem 2. Due to
the page constraints, we present only the most interesting case.
Let us assume that φ = ∀x(ψ) and that the proposition holds for ψ. Obviously, the equation
collapse(JφKIh) = collapse(inf{JψK
I
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU}) holds. Now we have to consider the following
three possible cases, where Ic := collapse(I) :
Case 1: inf{JψKIh[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = Fα. Then, using Lemma 1, there must be an u
′ ∈ HU
such that JψKIh[x 7→u′ ] = Fα. This implies, using the assumption, that JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u′] = F and hence
JφKIch = J∀x(ψ)K
Ic
h = inf{JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = F = collapse(Fα) = collapse(JφK
I
h) holds.
Case 2: inf{JψKI
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = Tα. Then, using the assumption, we get that JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u] = T
for all u ∈ HU and hence JφK
Ic
h = J∀x(ψ)K
Ic
h = inf{JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = T = collapse(Tα) =
collapse(JφKIh) holds.
Case 3: inf{JψKI
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = 0. We know that HU is a countable set and hence, using
Theorem 2, we get that there must be an u′ ∈ HU such that JψKIh[x 7→u′] = 0. The assumption
implies that JψKIc
h[x 7→u′] = 0 and 0 ≤ JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u] for all u ∈ HU . Hence we get that JφK
Ic
h =
J∀x(ψ)KIch = inf{JψK
Ic
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} = 0 = collapse(0) = collapse(JφK
I
h) holds. ⊓⊔
Proposition 6. Let P be a formula-based logic program. Then the 3-valued interpretation MP,3
is a 3-valued model of P .
Proof. We assume that A ← φ is a rule of P . Then, for every assignment h, we get that
JφK
MP,3
h
Proposition 5
= collapse(JφKMPh )
Theorem 6
≤ collapse(JAKMPh ) = JAK
MP,3
h holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 5. The 3-valued modelMP,3 is not a minimal model in general. Consider the logic program
P = {P1 ← ¬¬P1}. Then the infinite-valued modelMP maps P1 to 0 and this implies MP,3(P1) =
0. But the (2-valued) interpretation {〈P1,F〉} is a model of P and it is less thanMP,3. The ordering
on the 3-valued interpretations is introduced in [2] page 5.
However, Rondogiannis and Wadge prove in [3] that the 3-valued model MP,3 of a given normal
program P is equal to the 3-valued well-founded model of P and hence, using a result of Przy-
musinski (Theorem 3.1 of [2]), it is a minimal model of P . In the context of formula-based logic
programs we can prove Theorem 7. Before we start with the proof we have to consider the following
definition and a lemma that plays an important role in the proof of the theorem.
Definition 27. The negation degree deg¬(φ) of a formula φ is defined recursively on the structure
of φ as follows:
1. If φ is an atom, then deg¬(φ) := 0.
2. If φ = ψ1 ◦ ψ2, then deg¬(φ) := max{deg¬(ψ1), deg¬(ψ2)}. (◦ ∈ {∨,∧})
3. If φ = x(ψ), then deg¬(φ) := deg¬(ψ). ( ∈ {∃, ∀})
Lemma 9. Let I be an interpretation and γ, ζ ∈ ℵ1 such that for all A ∈ HB the following holds:
I(A) ∈ [F0,Fγ ] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tζ , T0]
Then for all formulas φ such that deg¬(φ) ≤ 1 and all variable assignments h the following holds:
JφKIh ∈
{
[F0,Fγ ] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tζ , T0], if deg¬(φ) = 0
[F0,Fmax{γ,ζ+1}] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tmax{γ+1,ζ}, T0], otherwise
Proof. We prove this by induction on the structure of φ.
Case 1: φ is an atom. Obviously, if φ = ⊥ or φ = ⊤, then the lemma holds. Otherwise, there is a
ground instance A ∈ HB of φ such that JφK
I
h = I(A) and the lemma also holds in this case.
Case 2: φ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2 and the lemma holds for ψ1 and ψ2. There is an i ∈ {1, 2} such that
Jψ1K
I
h ≤ JψiK
I
h and Jψ2K
I
h ≤ JψiK
I
h. Then, using deg¬(ψi) ≤ deg¬(φ) and JφK
I
h = JψiK
I
h, we get that
the lemma also holds for φ.
Case 3: φ = ∃x(ψ) and the lemma holds for ψ. Then, using Definition 15, we get that JφKIh =
sup{JψKIh[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU}. Let us assume that deg¬(φ) = 0. Then, using the assumption of this
case and deg¬(ψ) ≤ deg¬(φ), we get that
JψKIh[x 7→u] ∈ [F0,Fγ ] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tζ , T0] for all u ∈ HU . (9)
This implies that the values Fα and Tβ cannot be least upper bounds (for all α > γ and for all
β > ζ). For instance, assume that β > ζ and Tβ is a least upper bound. Then, using statement
(9), we get that 0 must be an upper bound, and hence this contradicts the assumption that Tβ
is the least upper bound. This implies JφKIh = sup{JψK
I
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} ∈ [F0,Fγ ] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tζ , T0]
and the lemma holds for φ. Now let us assume that deg¬(φ) = 1. This implies that JψK
I
h[x 7→u] ∈
[F0,Fmax{γ,ζ+1}] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tmax{γ+1,ζ}, T0] for all u ∈ HU . Then, using the same argumentation as
above, we get that JφKIh = sup{JψK
I
h[x 7→u]; u ∈ HU} ∈ [F0,Fmax{γ,ζ+1}] ∪ {0} ∪ [Tmax{γ+1,ζ}, T0]
and hence the lemma holds for φ.
Case 4: φ = ¬(ψ) and the lemma holds for ψ. This implies that deg¬(ψ) = 0, and hence JψK
I
h ∈
[F0,Fγ ]∪{0}∪[Tζ , T0]. If JψK
I
h ∈ [F0,Fγ ], then J¬ψK
I
h ∈ [Tγ+1, T0]. If JψK
I
h ∈ {0}, then J¬ψK
I
h ∈ {0}.
If JψKIh ∈ [Tζ , T0], then J¬ψK
I
h ∈ [F0,Fζ+1]. Hence, the lemma holds also for φ.
We omit the case φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 (resp. φ = ∀x(ψ) ), since it is similar to Case 2 (resp. Case 3). ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. Let P be a formula-based program such that for every rule A← φ in P the property
deg¬(φ) ≤ 1 holds. Then the 3-valued model MP,3 of the program P is a minimal 3-valued model.
Proof. Let N3 be an arbitrary 3-valued model of the program P , such that N3 is smaller or equal
to M3. This is equivalent to
MP,3‖F ⊆ N3‖F and N3‖T ⊆MP,3‖T . (10)
Now we have to prove that N3 is equal to MP,3. Note that this holds if and only if both equations
MP,3‖F = N3‖F and N3‖T =MP,3‖T hold.
Firstly, we prove that N3‖T =MP,3‖T by contradiction. We assume that
MP,3‖T \N3‖T 6= ∅. (11)
We know that MP,3‖T =
⋃
α∈ℵ1
MP ‖Tα and hence, using (11), there must be at least one ordinal
α ∈ ℵ1 such that MP ‖Tα \N3‖T 6= ∅. This justifies the definition αmin := min{α ∈ ℵ1; MP ‖Tα \
N3‖T 6= ∅}. Using Theorem 4 we get that Mαmin = T
ℵ1
P,αmin
(
⊔
β<αmin
Mβ). To improve readability
we define J :=
⊔
β<αmin
Mβ. It is obviously that αmin < δP , and hence Definition 25, Theorem 4,
and Definition 20 imply MP ‖Tαmin = MδP ‖Tαmin = Mαmin‖Tαmin =
⋃
γ∈ℵ1
T γP,αmin(J)‖Tαmin . This
and the definition of αmin justify the definition γmin := min{γ ∈ ℵ1; T
γ
P,αmin
(J)‖Tαmin\N3‖T 6= ∅}.
From Definition 22 and Definition 20 we infer that 0 < γmin and γmin is not an infinite limit ordinal,
hence γmin is a successor ordinal. We assume that γmin = γ
−
min + 1. Then, using the definition of
αmin and γmin, we get that T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J)‖Tζ ⊆ N3‖T for all ζ ≤ αmin. Using statement (10) we infer
that T γmin−1P,αmin (J)‖Fζ ⊆ N3‖F for all ζ < αmin. Hence, the following definition of the infinite-valued
interpretation N is well-defined.
N(A) :=


Fζ , if ζ < αmin & A ∈ T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J)‖Fζ
Fαmin , if A ∈ T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J)‖Fαmin ∩N3‖F
Fαmin+1, if A ∈ N3‖F \
⋃
ζ≤αmin
T γmin−1P,αmin (J)‖Fζ
Tζ , if ζ ≤ αmin & A ∈ T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J)‖Tζ
Tαmin+1, if A ∈ N3‖T \
⋃
ζ≤αmin
T γmin−1P,αmin (J)‖Tζ
0, otherwise
(for all A ∈ HB)
It is easy to see that
T γmin−1P,αmin (J) ⊑αmin N and that N3 = collapse(N). (12)
Since T γminP,αmin(J)‖Tαmin \ N3‖T is not empty, we can pick an A that is contained in this set.
Then, together with Definition 18, we get that Tαmin = T
γmin
P,αmin
(J)(A) = TP (T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J))(A) =
sup{JφKI ; A ← φ ∈ PG}, where I := T
γmin−1
P,αmin
(J). Hence, using Lemma 1, we can pick a rule
A ← φ ∈ PG such that JφKI = Tαmin . Then, using statement (12), Theorem 1, and Proposition
5, we get that JφKN = Tαmin and JφKN3 = JφKcollapse(N) = collapse(JφKN ) = T . Lastly, the fact
that N3 is a model and A ← φ is a ground instance of P imply that N3(A) = T . But this is a
contradiction because we have chosen A to be not contained in N3‖T . Hence, statement (11) must
be wrong (i.e., MP,3‖T = N3‖T ).
Secondly, we show that MP,3‖F = N3‖F . Definition 25 implies that MP,3‖F =
⋃
ζ<δP
MδP ‖Fζ
and MP,3‖T =
⋃
ζ<δP
MδP ‖Tζ . Then, using (10) and the result of the first part of this proof, we
get that
⋃
ζ<δP
MδP ‖Fζ ⊆ N3‖F and
⋃
ζ<δP
MδP ‖Tζ = N3‖T . Hence, the following definition of
the infinite-valued interpretation N is well-defined and N3 = collapse(N).
N(A) :=


Fζ , if ζ < δP & A ∈MδP ‖Fζ
FδP+1, if A ∈ N3‖F \MP,3‖F
Tζ , if ζ < δP & A ∈MδP ‖Tζ
0, otherwise
(for all A ∈ HB)
Now we are going to prove by transfinite induction on ζ ∈ ℵ1 that T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP ) ⊑δP+1 N .
Obviously, T ζP,δP+1(MδP ) =δP N for all ζ ∈ ℵ1. The Definition of N , Definition 24, and Theorem
4 imply N‖TδP+1 = ∅ = MδP+1‖Tδp+1 = T
ℵ1
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖TδP+1 =
⋃
γ<ℵ1
T γP,δP+1(MδP )‖TδP+1.
Hence, T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖TδP+1 ⊆ N‖TδP+1 for all ζ ∈ ℵ1. It remains to show that N‖FδP+1 ⊆
T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1 for all ζ ∈ ℵ1.
Case 1: ζ = 0. It is easy to prove (using Theorem 4, the result of the first part of this proof, and
N3‖F ∩N3‖T = ∅) that MδP ‖FδP+1 = HB \ (MP,3‖F ∪MP,3‖T ) ⊇ N3‖F \MP,3‖F = N‖FδP+1.
Case 2: ζ is a successor ordinal and T ζ−1P,δP+1(MδP ) ⊑δP+1 N . Then, using Definition 20 and Lemma
4, we get that
TP (T
ζ−1
P,δP+1
(MδP )) = T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP ) (13)
and
T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖Fδp+1 ⊆ T
ζ−1
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖FδP+1. (14)
We will prove that T ζ−1P,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1 \ T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖Fδp+1 and N‖FδP+1 are disjoint. This,
using T ζ−1P,δP+1(MδP ) ⊑δP+1 N and statement (14), implies that N‖FδP+1 ⊆ T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖FδP+1
and we have proved this case. Therefore, we choose an arbitrary A ∈ T ζ−1P,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1 \
T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖Fδp+1. Hence, using Lemma 4, we get that FδP+1 < T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP )(A). This, to-
gether with (13) and Definition 18, implies that there must be a rule A ← φ ∈ PG such that
FδP+1 < JφKI , where I is given by I := T
ζ−1
P,δP+1
(MδP ). Then, using the assumption I ⊑δP+1 N
and Theorem 1, we get that FδP+1 < JφKN . We know that for all atoms C ∈ HB the image N(C)
is an element of [F0, FδP+1]∪ {0}∪ [TδP , T0]. Then Lemma 9 and the fact that deg¬(φ) ≤ 1 imply
0 ≤ JφKN . Hence, using Proposition 5, N3 = collapse(N) and N3 is a model of P , we get that
0 ≤ JφKN3 ≤ N3(A). Finally, this implies A /∈ N3‖F ⊇ N3‖F \MP,3‖F = N‖Fδp+1.
Case 3: ζ > 0 is a limit ordinal and T γP,δP+1(MδP ) ⊑δP+1 N for all γ < ζ. This implies N‖FδP+1 ⊆
T γP,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1 for all γ < ζ. Hence, using Definition 20, we get that T
ζ
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖FδP+1 =⋂
γ∈ζ T
γ
P,δP+1
(MδP )‖FδP+1 ⊇ N‖FδP+1.
The above transfinite induction shows that N‖FδP+1 ⊆
⋂
ζ∈ℵ1
T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1. Then, us-
ing that MδP+1‖FδP+1 = ∅ and MδP+1‖FδP+1 =
⋂
ζ∈ℵ1
T ζP,δP+1(MδP )‖FδP+1, we get that ∅ =
N‖FδP+1 = N3‖F \MP,3‖F (see definition of N above). Last of all, using the assumption (10),
we get that MP,3‖F = N3‖F . ⊓⊔
6 Summary and Future Work
We have shown that every formula-based logic program P has a least infinite-valued model MP
with respect to the ordering ⊑∞ given on the set of all infinite-valued interpretations. We have
presented how to construct the model MP with the help of the immediate consequence operator
TP and have shown that MP is also the least of all fixed points of the operator TP . Moreover, we
have considered the 3-valued interpretation MP,3 and have proven that it is a 3-valued model of
the program P . Furthermore, we have observed a restricted class of formula-based programs such
that the associated 3-valued models are even minimal models.
There are some aspects of this paper that we feel should be further investigated. Firstly, we believe
that the main results of this work also hold in Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatic set theory without the
Axiom of Choice (ZF). For instance, we could use the class of all ordinals Ω instead of the cardinal
ℵ1 in Theorem 3. Secondly, we have proven that the ordinal δmax is at least ωω, but on the other
hand we do not know a program P such that ωω < δP . So, one could assume that δmax = ω
ω.
Thirdly, the negation-as-failure rule is sound for MP (respectively, MP,3) when we are dealing
with a normal program P . Within the context of formula-based programs we think it would be
fruitful to investigate the rule of definitional reflection presented in [4] instead of negation-as-
failure. Lastly, we believe that the presented theory can be useful in the areas of databases and
data mining. We are looking forward to collaborate with research groups specializing in these areas.
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